Southern Methodist University

SMU Scholar
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2009

A Brief Reflection on the Problem of Person-Altering
Consequences
Gregory S. Crespi
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law

Recommended Citation
Gregory S. Crespi, A Brief Reflection on the Problem of Person-Altering Consequences (2009)

This document is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of SMU
Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

A Brief Reflection on the Problem of
Person-Altering Consequences
Gregory Scott Crespi, Professor of Law

SMU Dedman School of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper
Number 00-43

This paper can be downloaded without charge
from the Social Science Research Network electronic library at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393839

A Brief Reflection on the Problem
Of Person-Altering Consequences

by
Gregory Scott Crespi*

*Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist
University. J.D., Yale; Ph.D. University of Iowa.

Preliminary Draft
April 13, 2009

Many social policies require substantial sacrifices by existing
persons in order to benefit the members of distant future generations.
Particularly salient examples of this are the elaborate and expensive
efforts now undertaken to prevent high-level radioactive wastes from
polluting the biosphere, or the stringent restrictions that may be soon be
imposed on burning fossil fuels in order to mitigate the long-term climate
change consequences of global warming. However, this trade-off does
not only exist in the environmental policy area. Many other social
policies also call for substantial sacrifices to be made at least partly if not
largely on behalf of distant future generations.

The existence of this trade-off presents a fundamental and difficult
ethical question that is far too often overlooked by policy makers. Do we
have any ethical obligations at all to the yet-unborn members of future
generations? Are we under a moral obligation to consider their interests,
as best we can anticipate what those interests will be, as well as our own
concerns in making these policy decisions? Or are we morally free to
choose among policies solely with regard to their consequences for
existing persons, with no obligations to concern ourselves with their
impacts on future generations? In this brief essay I will try to
demonstrate that this is a far more difficult question to answer than is
commonly realized.
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If we do in fact have ethical obligations to take into account the
impacts of our policies upon future generations, then this raises the
derivative question of how then should we balance the interests of the
members of those future generations with the rights and interests of
existing persons? I will try to show that this is also a much tougher
question to answer than is generally understood.

There is a fairly broad consensus among current policy makers that
we do have ethical obligations to future generations to take their interests
into account in choosing our actions. One rarely if ever hears arguments
to the contrary. There is, of course, considerable controversy regarding
the precise nature and scope of these obligations. But there does appear
to be general agreement that we do have some such moral obligations that
we need to respect. In addition, at least in America if not elsewhere,
there is also a broad consensus that the primary analytical framework that
should be used for measuring and balancing the legitimate interests of
future generations against the interests of existing persons is a costbenefit analysis framework.1 In this framework the impacts of a policy
on each affected generation are measured by the yardstick of the
willingness-to-pay of its members to enjoy or to avoid the policy’
s
consequences, and then those future impacts of the policy are
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appropriately discounted to a smaller present value, prior to their
aggregation with its current impacts, in making an overall assessment of
the merits of the policy.2

I have written several related articles over the past few years in
which I have tried to broaden the conversations now taking place
regarding these difficult ethical and policy assessment questions in the
environmental policy context by arguing in some detail that they cannot
be adequately addressed without also taking into account in some fashion
3
what I have called “
the problem of person-altering consequences.”
This

important problem is unfortunately largely if not completely overlooked
in current discussions. In this short essay I hope to generalize this
analysis and communicate to a broader readership the nature of this
problem, and make clear that the problem also comes up with regard to
many other social policy decisions outside of the environmental context
that also pose trade-offs between the impacts on existing persons and
those affecting future generations.4

The central idea that I would like to communicate here is the
simple yet momentous point that all social policies will inevitably have
geometrically proliferating and eventually universal and eternal personaltering consequences. That fact has major implications for
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conceptualizing the nature of our ethical obligations to future generations,
if there in fact are any such obligations, and for balancing the interests of
future generations against those of existing persons when formulating
policies.

Let me begin by briefly explaining exactly what I mean by the
phrase “
person-altering consequences,”and then I will try to make clear
the dramatic and rather troubling implications such consequences present
for determining our ethical obligations to future generations, and for the
assessment of policies. This phrase is one that I myself have coined, but
the underlying concept is not original to me but derives from work done
in the late-1970’
s and early-1980’
s by the noted British philosopher
Derek Parfit and some of his academic contemporaries.5 Parfit
originally, and in my opinion somewhat inaptly, labelled his insight the
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“
Non-Identity Problem,”
and it has been later discussed by other

philosophers under that moniker, but I have chosen to use what I think is
the more descriptively accurate phrase “
person-altering consequences”
that better communicates its core meaning.

Parfit’
s insight is one of those simple yet profound insights that
sometimes win people Nobel Prizes 30 or 40 years later after their
significance becomes widely appreciated. It is an idea that is pretty
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obvious once it is explained to you. It then seems like something that you
have already known all along, even if you have never fully articulated it
to yourself or to anyone else, yet it is an insight with dramatic
implications for many fields of law.

Parfit’
s insight starts with the recognition of the indisputable fact
that the particular sperm-egg fusion that results from a successful act of
human reproduction is an event that is radically contingent. The outcome
is highly sensitive to minor changes in any of a large number of factors.
Which particular one of the hundreds of millions of sperm that are
released in an ejaculation will unite with the female egg, if any, is a very
uncertain event. Even the slightest change in the timing or any other
aspect of a reproductively successful act of intercourse will almost surely
lead to a different sperm-egg fusion, and therefore ultimately to the birth
of a genetically different individual than would have otherwise been born.
The person now conceived and born will be a different individual in the
most fundamental genetic sense.

The consequences of this simple fact are momentous. Any social
policy measure that is significant enough in its direct or indirect impact
on human behaviour to lead to even a single different sperm-egg fusion
taking place will create a genetically different individual than the person
6

that would have been born absent the implementation of the policy. Even
the most minor and locally-focused policy will surely have that much
impact on someone’
s behavior. And over time, as that now genetically
different individual is born and matures and over their life influences
numerous other people in major or minor ways, this will result in an
exponentially spreading cascade of individuals being conceived and born
that are now genetically different from those persons that would
otherwise have been conceived and born absent the policy’
s initial
impact. This cascade of genetic alterations will lead eventually (and
probably sooner rather than later) to the creation of an entirely different
population of human beings for all the rest of eternity than those persons
that would have been conceived and born absent that initial and perhaps
very minor policy impact.

In other words, even a quite small initial policy impact will
ultimately lead, after a period of time probably on the order of no more
than a few decades at the most, to the entire human population that would
have been born and lived their lives throughout the rest of eternity from
that point on now never even coming into existence.7 They will instead
be replaced by a population consisting of genetically different
individuals. Yet another way to put this is that any social policy will
have rapidly spreading and eventually universal person-altering
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consequences in that it will alter the fundamental genetic identities of all
future persons. Moreover, those person-altering consequences can be
seen to be necessary conditions of the existence of all future persons who
come into existence, since those persons would never have been
conceived and born absent the policy’
s implementation. Those
consequences make life possible for the members of future generations
who are conceived and born, and will thus be far more significant to those
persons than are all of the other impacts of the policy combined.

Most attempts to assess the ethical implications of policies that
have long-term effects as well as immediate impacts, or to value in dollar
terms the overall effects of such policies, have simply ignored these
person-altering consequences. As a result, the conclusions that these
efforts have reached are unfortunately irrelevant for assessing the relative
merits of the actual choices that those policies present.

As an example, consider for a moment the seemingly rather radical
approach of taking all of our existing high-level radioactive wastes, on
which we now devote literally billions of dollars/year of resources to try
to isolate from the biological environment, and simply putting those
wastes into ordinary, inexpensive steel barrels with perhaps 150- to 200year containment capabilities in a salt-water environment, and then
8

dumping them by barge somewhere into the middle of the Pacific Ocean
and just forgetting about them. The likely response by current world
leaders to such a proposal would be that this would be an outrageous
violation of our ethical obligations to consider the welfare of distant
future generations. Moreover, a typical cost-benefit analysis of this
waste-dumping policy would doubtless conclude that it would result in
such massive burdens for all distant future generations, commencing
perhaps 200 years or so from now and continuing on for eons untold, that
even when the benefits to existing persons of freeing those billions of
dollars/year of resources for other uses are considered the policy’
s
impacts would still be on balance massively negative. Such an ocean
waste-dumping proposal would be a complete non-starter politically, I am
sure.

The conventional framework of analysis that underlies this
disparaging conclusion, however, implicitly involves an assessment of
how future persons would likely feel about living in a world with a
potentially very serious ocean radioactive waste problem, as compared to
those same persons experiencing their lives without that radioactive waste
problem. But this comparison is revealed to be totally inapt, and thus
irrelevant to the real choices at hand, once one is aware of person-altering
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consequences. The proper comparison of alternatives that should be
made for ethical and policy valuation purposes is quite different.

Let me explain. If we were to continue to spend billions of
dollars/year on high-level radioactive waste storage, as we do now, there
will then be one particular population of future persons conceived and
born over time in future years. If, however, we cheaply dump those
radioactive wastes into the Pacific Ocean in simple steel barrels, and free
those billions of dollars/year of resources for other uses, those new uses
of those considerable resources will immediately trigger an exponentially
spreading cascade of person-altering consequences. Well before the time
perhaps a couple of centuries from now or so when those radioactive
toxins begin to leak into the biosphere, the entire human population alive
then and later coming into being for the rest of eternity will owe their
very existence to that waste-dumping policy; it will have been a
necessary condition of their conception and birth. They would simply
never have been conceived and born had the ocean radioactive wastedumping not taken place. In that event an entirely different group of
persons would have come into being.
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The proper hypothetical question to imagine posing to those future
persons who live in the post-ocean waste dumping world, for either
ethical assessment or policy valuation purposes, is therefore:
“
Do you prefer the world that you now live in, facing as you
do a perhaps quite serious ocean pollution problem resulting from
our prior radioactive waste-dumping policy, to a world which is
without such a radioactive waste problem, but which is also a
world in which neither you nor any of the people you have ever
known have ever come into existence?”
In other words, the proper hypothetical question to ask is “
Do you
prefer living your life with the radioactive waste problem, or would you
prefer non-existence?”That Hobson’
s Choice is in fact the true choice of
alternatives that would be presented to them! My surmise, from what I
know of people (and supported by the statistically rather low suicide
rates) is that virtually everyone asked this question would strongly prefer
their existence, even with the particular and perhaps serious set of
problems that their life posed for them, to non-existence. If this is the
case, then we have not actually harmed any person by dumping those
radioactive wastes into the Pacific Ocean.

If we do dump those wastes into the ocean, then those future
persons who are conceived and born with the radioactive waste problem
to deal with, if they thought about it, would be grateful for what we have
done, in a sense, because they would not otherwise exist. On the other
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hand, one can at least imagine the untold zillions of what one might
loosely call “
unrealised potential persons,”that is, persons who might
have been conceived and born under other circumstances, but who as a
result of our choices will now never actually be conceived. But those
wholly imaginary and non-existent unrealised potential persons of course
have no standing to complain about the particular choices that we have
made. My conclusion, admittedly troubling but seemingly impossible to
avoid, is that since we probably will not harm any actual future person by
our ocean radioactive waste-dumping actions, since they would likely all
strongly approve of our actions so that they could come into existence,
then under the conventional secular, consequentialist ethical premises that
underlie most modern thinking8 we would simply not have violated any
ethical obligations to anyone by dumping those radioactive wastes in the
Pacific Ocean.

More broadly, and rather disturbingly, the pervasiveness of personaltering consequences means that any social policy that we undertake, no
matter how radically present-oriented it is, and no matter how indifferent
we are to its long-term consequences for future persons, is ethically selfvalidating under conventional ethical criteria in that one of its
consequences will the person-altering consequence of bringing into being
a future population that would not want us to have acted in any other
12

way. So why not just dump those radioactive wastes into the Pacific
Ocean and free lots of resources for the enjoyment of existing persons?

Where does this line of thinking lead, as a practical matter? Well,
if one now recognizes the nature of the problem posed for conventional
ethical assessment by person-altering consequences, but still feels at an
intuitive level, as I do, that there must somehow be something morally
wrong with pursuing such radically present-oriented policies as my ocean
radioactive waste-dumping hypothetical, then I would like to suggest that
what one is actually doing, probably implicitly rather than explicitly, is
applying a non-consequentialist ethical criterion to condemn such
policies. That is, one is likely applying an ethical criterion that is not
grounded upon an assessment of the policy’
s consequences for the
specific individual persons who will later come into being, but one that
assesses the ethical merits of a policy on some basis other than those
consequences. In addition, one is also, again probably implicitly rather
than explicitly, applying some valuations algorithim in order to translate
this non-consequentialist policy assessment into a rather large number in
dollar terms before aggregating it with the conventional, financial
measure of the policies’consequences for existing persons, in order to
reach such an overall negative assessment of the merits of the policy.
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It is indeed a major step for one to leave the safe moorings of
conventional secular, consequential ethical premises for the murky and
uncharted waters of non-consequentialist ethical standards and policy
valuation criteria. One is certainly free to reject the use of conventional
ethical standards and proceed in this other fashion, if one chooses. But I
would recommend that before one does so one first reflects carefully
upon what alternative, non-consequentialist ethical premises they are
explicitly or implicitly applying in making these assessments, and
whether they really do accept those ethical premises as valid. In addition,
I would recommend that one also try to be clear about the justifications
for the particular valuation algorithim one is are using to quantify the
non-consequentialist assessment of a policy in dollar terms before
aggregating that assessment with the policy’
s consequences for existing
persons to reach overall conclusions.

The problem of person-altering consequences not only dramatically
undercuts conventional, secular ethical thinking, but also renders rather
useless the widely-used framework of cost-benefit analysis9 that is based
on the methodology of aggregating the willingness-to-pay of the persons
affected by a policy to evaluate its merits. Let me briefly explain.
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Conventional cost-benefit analysis assesses the impacts of policies
on future generations by hypothetically positing the willingness-to-pay
question to the same hypothetical future persons under two different
scenarios, life with the policy impacts and life without the policy impacts,
and then comparing the answers to evaluate the policy.10 The assumption
is therefore made, usually implicitly rather than explicitly, that the same
future persons will exist whether or not a policy is implemented. This
“
same persons will exist either way”assumption is, however, clearly
revealed to be untenable once one recognizes the existence of personaltering consequences. When conducting cost-benefit analyses, future
persons’hypothetical willingness-to-pay valuations of a policy’
s impacts
should instead be made as compared to the actual, demonstrable
alternative of those persons’non-existence, should that policy not be
implemented.

Unfortunately, if the hypothetical willingness-to-pay question was
to be posed in this proper fashion that contrasts the actual achievable
alternatives, any policy whatsoever would likely receive a massive (if not
infinite) positive valuation from each of the specific future populations of
individuals that the policy will bring into existence.11 Even if these
valuations are then discounted quite heavily to reflect their futurity, one
will still inevitably conclude that all policy alternatives whatsoever,
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including the null option of taking no action of any sort which would lead
to the birth of a particular specific population of future individuals over
time that would obviously favor that inaction, will generate massive
future benefits. These massive future benefits extending for all eternity
are obviously going to be impossible to meaningfully quantify and
compare across alternatives, and in any event the size of those future
benefits will completely dominate and render trivial any adverse policy
impacts upon existing persons, no matter how widespread and severe
those current impacts might be.12 This bizarre, blanket result that all
policy options whatsoever will generate massive net benefits of
indeterminate size that completely dominate any adverse impacts upon
existing persons would render any cost-benefit analyses done in this
fashion rather useless as a practical tool for helping policy makers to
choose among policy alternatives.

One could perhaps attempt to try to salvage in part the cost-benefit
framework of analysis by, again, instead first applying a nonconsequentialist ethical criterion to assess the significance of a policy for
future generations, rather than using the normal secular, consequentialist
willingness-to-pay framework, and then attempt to quantify into dollar
terms in some fashion this non-consequentialist assessment before
aggregating it with the usual willingness-to-pay based assessment of the
16

policy’
s impacts on existing persons.13 But I will be the first to admit that
I have no idea what would be the appropriate non-consequentialist ethical
criterion to apply.

Consider again my ocean radioactive waste dumping hypothetical.
What, exactly, is morally wrong with doing something like this that as I
have shown will benefit virtually all if not all existing and future persons,
by their own assessments? Has God somewhere decreed that radically
present-oriented policies are morally wrong, even if no existing or future
person is thereby injured? What evidence exists supporting this claim?

Alternatively, should we retain a secular orientation, but now focus
upon the nature of the intentions of the actors, rather than upon the
inevitably beneficial consequences of their actions for future generations
given their person-altering consequences? But are intentions rather than
likely results the proper ethical touchstone? Or should we perhaps take
the tact of ascribing existential reality and moral significance to some
impersonal, collective generalization such as, for example, “
the human
race,”and then to try evaluate policies in terms of their beneficial or
adverse impacts upon this collective generalization that stand apart from
the policy’
s impacts upon the specific individuals that together comprise
that generalization? But does the “
human race”really exist apart from
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the specific individuals that comprise it, and even if it does exist in some
sense do we really owe ethical obligations to anyone or anything except
specific individuals? Finally, even if we can somehow come up with a
plausible non-consequentialist ethical criterion for policy analysis, I have
no idea of how one would then meaningfully translate such a nonconsequentialist assessment into dollar terms for aggregation with the
policy’
s consequences for existing persons, in order to reach a
meaningful overall policy assessment.

Let me briefly summarize my conclusions. Once one recognizes
the nature and ubiquity of person-altering consequences, one is
unfortunately forced to concede that all policy alternatives whatsoever are
ethically self-validating if one judges them by conventional secular,
consequentialist ethical standards. Those ethical criteria thus can no
longer provide meaningful moral guidance as to when sacrifices by
existing persons on behalf of distant future generations are called for, if
ever. This presents a real conundrum for policy makers, since there is
little if any consensus regarding which if any of the many competing
secular or theistic non-consequentialist ethical criteria should be applied
to assess future policy impacts in making decisions, nor how such nonconsequentialist assessments are to be quantified into dollar terms for
aggregation with the policy consequences for existing persons.
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Moreover, cost-benefit analysis is now shown to be an untenable
analytical approach, since cost-benefit analyses that ignore personaltering consequences are clearly irrelevant to the real choices at hand,
and such analyses that incorporate person-altering consequences in the
usual willingness-to-pay manner will always unhelpfully conclude that all
policy options whatsoever will generate massive net benefits of uncertain
magnitude that will completely dominate any adverse impacts upon
existing persons.

So the person-altering consequences of policies indeed pose a
significant intellectual problem, and one that I am admittedly at
somewhat of a loss as to how to resolve. I hope that I have made clear,
however, that the current practice of simply ignoring person-altering
consequences is untenable, and that we need to figure out a better way to
address those consequences.
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“
American government is becoming a cost-benefit state.”Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State;
The Future of Cost Benefit Regulatory Protection (2002), at 19-20.
2
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